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Abstract
The administrative ability of the state to design and implement effective policy is an essential
condition for economic development. Social scientists have long devoted attention to domestic forces
underpinning state capacity, but not to the impact of the world system. A key mechanism through
which this operates is the activities of Western-dominated international organizations, exerting
pressure on developing countries to unleash market forces. We take on this task by examining the
impact of policy reforms mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the bureaucratic
quality of its borrowing countries. To develop a nuanced account of this impact, we scrutinize the
IMF’s practice of ‘conditionality’—far-reaching policy reforms borrowing countries must implement
as a precondition for access to loans—which may (unintentionally) incapacitate state bureaucracies. In
particular, so-called ‘structural conditions’ can exert a deleterious effect on bureaucratic quality, as
they increase the risk that bureaucrats fall prey to special interests and reduce the range of policy
instruments available to bureaucrats to steer the economy. We test these arguments using a new
dataset on IMF conditionality from 1985 to 2014. Our analysis shows that structural conditions—and,
more specifically, conditions on privatization, price deregulation, and public sector employment—
reduce bureaucratic quality. Deploying a new instrumentation technique, the analysis also discounts
the possibility that the relationship is driven by the Fund imposing structural conditions precisely in
countries with low bureaucratic quality. These findings suggest that conditionality needs to be
carefully designed so that it does not undermine local institutions.
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quality
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1. Introduction
The administrative ability of the state to design and implement effective policy is an essential
condition for economic development (Amsden 1989; Evans and Rauch 1999; Mazzucato 2015).
Drawing on the insights of Max Weber, sociologists have suggested several pathways
underpinning the development of capable bureaucracies. One perspective posits that cultural
factors—like a Protestant work ethic—are important for determinants of state capacity
development by commanding citizens’ obedience (Weber 1930; Anderson 1991; Gorski 1993).
Others emphasize the role of economic modernization, contending that industrial societies—as
opposed to agrarian ones—have more sophisticated needs to be addressed by a central state
(Smelser 1964; Gellner 1983; Geddes 1994). The resource needs of warfare also drive many
countries to discipline state officers, thereby developing a functioning bureaucracy (Tilly 1990;
Mann 1995; Hechter 2000).
Scholarship in global and transnational sociology has also elaborated on the ways in which
international forces impact the capabilities of states. First, mimetic and normative isomorphism
results in the gradual spread of policy scripts that circulate transnationally, as states adopt and
adapt them to suit their purposes (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Meyer et al. 1997; Drori and
Meyer 2006; Chorev 2012; Pinheiro, Chwieroth, and Hicks 2015). For example, Hwang (2006)
shows the world-wide rise of national development plans in the post-war era, following dominant
norms in the world polity on state planning. In contrast to the soft and slow normative-isomorphic
processes, world systems and dependency theories emphasize structural inequalities inherent to
contemporary globalization (Wallerstein 1974; Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Chase-Dunn 1998).
Within this framework, powerful intergovernmental organizations—like the European Union or
the World Bank—are central actors that undergird and perpetuate the dependency of ‘peripheral’
nations (developing countries) on the capitalist ‘core’ (e.g., Hanley, King, and Tóth 2002; Panitch
and Gindin 2012). To do so, these organizations make their financial or technical support to
developing countries conditional on the introduction of certain reforms that—explicitly or
implicitly—favor the interests of the West and weaken bureaucratic quality (Hamm, King, and
Stuckler 2012; Ban 2016).
In this article, we build a theoretical and empirical bridge between world systems theory and the
Weberian-inspired political sociology arguments on state capacity. While these two strands of
scholarship have hitherto developed in little dialogue, we argue that their insights can be fruitfully
combined to develop a distinctive global and transnational sociological perspective on the
determinants of state capacity. Our analysis focuses on the activities of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF)—one of the world’s most powerful international organizations—which has
been able to set the broad parameters of economic reform in the developing world (Halliday and
Carruthers 2007; 2009). This power stems from the organization’s systemic role in upholding
global financial stability, which endows it with extensive resources and an unrivaled position as a
global lender of last resort. Through the practice of ‘conditionality’, the IMF can mandate farreaching policy changes, including the overhaul of state administrations (Babb and Carruthers
2008). The IMF contends that such policies are necessary for securing macroeconomic stability
(Khan and Knight 1983), while critics point to devastating and counterproductive effects on
developing countries (Babb 2005; Evans and Sewell 2013; Sassen 2014). For example, IMF
programs have been linked to the retrenchment of public services, the dismantlement of state
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bureaucracies, and civil unrest (Walton and Ragin 1990; Hanley et al. 2002; King and Sznajder
2006).
A major shortcoming of this scholarship is that IMF lending programs—the main mechanism by
which this prototypical Western-dominated multilateral organization shapes peripheral states—
are generally treated as ‘black boxes’: it is assumed that they all contain a similar set of promarket and anti-state reforms that devastate public sectors. We question the merits of this simple
narrative. Using new data on conditionality, we examine the extent to which distinct components
of IMF programs have a differential impact on bureaucratic quality. In particular, we distinguish
between two types of IMF conditionality: structural conditions, or intrusive reforms that seek to
transform countries’ political economies via deregulation, liberalization, and privatization; and
stabilization conditions, which are less-intrusive broad targets on macroeconomic indicators
intended to reduce balance-of-payments deficits (Polak 1991; Toye 1994; Vreeland 2007; Dreher
2009; Woo 2013). We posit that structural conditions diminish the ability of states to recruit,
train, and retain qualified personnel, and so we expect them to reduce bureaucratic quality.
Empirically, we study the effects of IMF conditionality on state capacity in developing countries
from 1985 to 2014. Using data from the International Country Risk Guide as a measure of
bureaucratic quality, we find that structural conditions reduce bureaucratic quality and that
stabilization conditions exert no significant effect. Further analysis reveals that, more specifically,
conditions that require privatization of state-owned enterprises, lifting of price regulations, and
reductions in the number or wages of civil servants underlie the negative effect of structural
conditions. In addition, using data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Surveys, we find that firms experience more bribery by public officials when countries under
IMF programs face more structural conditions. Our results are significant even after accounting
for non-random selection into IMF programs and the potential endogeneity of conditionality.
Confidence in our findings is also bolstered by the fact that they are consistent across both
perception- and experience-based measures of bureaucratic quality.
By shedding light on the erstwhile undertheorized relationship between state capacity and world
systems and dependency theories, our article integrates previously disparate insights from
national-level political-sociological arguments (e.g., Skocpol 1979; Mann 1986; Evans and Rauch
1999) and global and transnational sociology (e.g., Hanley et al. 2002; King and Sznajder 2006;
Li and Hicks 2016). Our findings also contribute to other branches of social scientific inquiry on
state capacity, including political science (e.g., Hendrix 2010; Fortin-Rittberger 2014; Cingolani,
Thomsson, and de Crombrugghe 2015) and economics (e.g., Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Rodrik,
Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2008; Broich, Szirmai, and
Thomsson 2015). Further, we contribute to sociologically-informed policy debates by
demonstrating the malleability of state capacity within a shorter time horizon than sociologists
had come to expect based on earlier research. Finally, we offer methodological contributions to
studies on the consequences of reform programs mandated by international organizations. In
using a compound instrumentation technique to account for endogeneity of conditionality, our
estimates lend themselves to causal interpretation, while other interpretations—for example, that
countries with weak state capacity might receive systematically different conditions—can be
ruled out.
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2. State capacity, bureaucratic quality, and the world system
2.1. Bureaucratic quality as a key ingredient of state capacity
Sociologists have long recognized that capable states require professional bureaucracies—
characterized by legal rationality, hierarchical organization and incorruptible staff—committed to
delivering high-quality public services (Weber 1978; Skocpol 1979; Mann 1986). In their seminal
article, Evans and Rauch (1999) unpack ‘Weberianness’ as a synonym for bureaucratic quality,
comprising meritocratic staffing, professional training, long-term career opportunities in the
public sector, competitive salaries, and performance-based rewards. Using surveys to collect
information on these variables for 35 countries, they find that Weberianness positively correlates
with economic growth. More recently, researchers from the Quality of Government Institute
assembled an expert-survey dataset on the structure of public bureaucracies for 159 countries,
covering three dimensions of bureaucratic quality: professionalization, openness, and impartiality
(Dahlström et al. 2015). Based on these data, Nistotskaya and Cingolani (2016) show that
countries in which bureaucracies are more insulated from day-to-day oversight by individual
politicians have more effective business regulation and higher rates of business entry. Teorell
(2015) finds that having an impartial, depoliticized, and incorruptible bureaucracy reduces the
risk of interstate conflict.
Yet, robust bureaucratic quality also requires links between state bureaucrats and societal actors,
notably business. For example, Block (1987) draws on the experience of high-income countries to
show that when business interests acquire too much influence over the state administration, state
policies will be least successful in solving societal problems. In a development context, the
economic trajectory of the East Asian ‘tiger’ countries highlights the importance of well-targeted
industrial policy interventions aimed at addressing key impediments to catching up with highincome countries (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Evans 1998). These interventions are most
impactful under conditions of ‘embedded autonomy’ of the state bureaucracy; that is, a statesociety arrangement in which bureaucrats enjoy autonomy from, but also close ties to, business
elites to devise and implement successful policies (Evans 1995). In other words, embeddedness
requires that bureaucrats have a close eye on the needs of businesses to identify the appropriate
development policies. Indeed, “only a well-trained bureaucracy will be able to manage the
strategic collaboration… between the private sector and the government with the aim of learning
where the most important bottlenecks are” (Rodrik 2014: 485). Effective delivery of public
services is endangered, however, if bureaucrats fall prey to particularistic interests (Rothstein and
Teorell 2012).
2.2. World systems, dependency, and state capacity in the developing world
While scholars have long discussed domestic forces underpinning state capacity (e.g., Gellner
1983; Gorski 1993; Geddes 1994), in this article we focus on the IMF as an international force
that exerts policy pressure directed toward unleashing market forces in borrowing countries. One
body of scholarship in global and transnational sociology has emphasized mimetic and normative
isomorphic processes that result in the gradual spread of policy scripts circulating transnationally,
as states adopt them to suit their purposes (Meyer et al. 1997; Drori and Meyer 2006; Chorev
2012). In relation to the IMF, mimetic isomorphism occurs when states emulate the behavior of
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more successful countries that have adopted the organization’s policy advice (Henisz, Zelner, and
Guillén 2005; Dobbin et al. 2007; Pinheiro et al. 2015); and normative isomorphism describes
how IMF staff interact with local officials via technical assistance to bring about new state norms
(Chwieroth 2007).
In contrast to these soft and slow isomorphic processes, we deploy insights from dependency and
world systems theories to understand how IMF lending programs affect state capacity.1 These
theories emphasize that countries interact in a hierarchical global economic architecture in which
‘core’ or advanced nations reproduce conditions of underdevelopment for ‘peripheral’ or
developing nations (Amin 1976; Wallerstein 1974; 1979). The earliest studies in this tradition
argued that the economic penetration of developing countries by advanced countries—in the form
of exploitative trade and investments in natural resources—stunted economic development in the
former through transfers in surplus to the latter (Baran 1957; Frank 1967). The consequences of
dependency for state capacity remained generally undertheorized, but the implication was that
underdevelopment would persist. As Wallerstein (1979: 20) explained, strong “state machineries
in core areas has as its direct counterpart the decline of the state machineries in peripheral areas.”
Indeed, since potentially-taxable surpluses shifted to advanced nations through exploitative
relationships, peripheral states were consigned to perennially limited public revenues to invest in
building up capable bureaucracies (Kentor 1981).
Importantly, one strand of world systems thinking articulated state capacity as an essential
component for peripheral states to improve their position among peripheral countries; that is, to
achieve so-called ‘dependent development’ (Evans 1979). Rather than a paragon of Weberianness
(as defined above), the dependent-development state is primarily the instrument of the nationalindustrialist capitalist class allied with international capital (Evans 1979). By implication, such
states are proficient at advancing the interests of ruling economic and political elites, often in the
context of authoritarianism. Yet, they lack the bureaucratic apparatus necessary to effectively
deliver public goods. For example, over the 1960s and 1970s, the captured bureaucracy of Kenya
under President Jomo Kenyatta delivered concentrated benefits to political and economic elites of
the president’s own ethnic group (the Kikuyu), but failed to implement policies that would
improve the long-run developmental trajectory of the country or the well-being of non-aligned
ethnic groups (Leys 1975; Stubbs 2015).
While initial studies on trade exports and investments in raw material production or agriculture
focused on relationships of colonial dominance, scholars soon emphasized new forms of
dependency consolidated in the postwar period. They argued that foreign aid constituted an
extension of the relationship of dependency which served to preserve or widen economic
disparities between core and peripheral nations (Dos Santos 1970; Hayter 1971; see also Moyo
2009). In this context, donor states provide aid to increase the likelihood that governments of the
periphery will tolerate the continuation of outflows of private profits and interests on past debts
(Hayter 1971). Such aid may support governments by providing a short-term solution to
economic difficulties, but in the long term it perpetuates dependence on continued foreign aid
                                                                                                                
1

To be sure, dependency and world systems theories are not entirely equivalent; most notably, the former
argued that the capitalist world-economy had a bimodal core–periphery structure, while the latter added
appreciation for the ‘semi-periphery’ (Karataşlı 2017). However, in relation to state capacity, both theories reach
similar conclusions: weak state capacity prevails (Wallerstein 1979).
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flows (Hayter 1971). A separate strand of literature also highlighted how aid may undermine state
capacity: countries with greater foreign aid revenue are less reliant on tax revenues drawn from
citizens, and thus face less domestic pressure to maintain popular legitimacy through investment
in effective public institutions (Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Moss, Pettersson, and Van de Walle
2006).
More recent perspectives document how international financial institutions (IFIs)—the IMF, the
World Bank, and regional development banks—facilitate core-periphery dependency relations
(Bradshaw and Huang 1991; Shandra et al 2004; Harper and Snowden 2017). These studies posit
that IFIs inhibit economic development by siphoning surplus from developing countries in the
form of debt and interest payments on loans. Further, the practice of conditionality gives
creditors—the high-income countries controlling IFI operations—unparalleled leverage to alter
the political economies of borrowing countries in the interests of the West (Stone 2002; Babb
2009). Most conspicuously, Western business and financial interests have benefited from
securing contracts and expanding their access to developing countries implementing structural
adjustment programs (Wedel 1998; Gould 2003; Sassen 2014). This evidence is in line with the
expectations of world systems theory: the conditionalities of the IMF and development banks
entrench developing countries within the periphery of the global economic architecture. However,
studies are yet to scrutinize the specific impact of international organizations, like the IMF, on
state capacity.
In short, according to world systems and dependency theories, weak states occupy peripheral
positions in the world economic order, and are kept compliant through their dependence on
foreign investment, aid, and loans from IFIs. In this context, these institutions affirm the power
inequities inherent in globalization (Halliday and Carruthers 2009). The empirical challenge,
then, is to identify how world-system pressures impact state capacity in the developing world,
and—to this end—we focus on the case of the activities of the IMF, widely considered “the
world’s most powerful agen[t] of economic reform” (Halliday and Carruthers 2007: 1137). In
other words, this organization serves as a ‘strategic research site’ (Merton 1987), offering an
analytical lens for empirical scrutiny into the organizational apparatus of the world system and its
impact on state capacity.
3. IMF conditionality and bureaucratic quality
To what extent and how does IMF conditionality impact bureaucratic quality, a key component of
state capacity? The substantive content of conditionality reflects the belief in neoclassical
economics—an intellectual tradition firmly located in core capitalist nations (FourcadeGourinchas and Babb 2002)—that states should perform a minimal role in the economy
(Callaghy 1989: 116). According to this line of thinking, government interventions in the
economy, especially through industrial policy, ‘crowd out’ the private sector and spur rentseeking and inefficient allocation of resources (e.g., Krueger 1974). Having embraced such ideas
during training at prestigious economics departments (like the University of Chicago) and
emboldened by the rise to power of free-market ideologues (like Ronald Reagan and Margaret
Thatcher), IMF staff put anti-state economic theories into policy practice from the 1980s onwards
(Babb 2009; Nelson 2014; Kentikelenis and Seabrooke 2017). Structural adjustment programs
rolling out ‘Washington consensus’ policies of privatization, liberalization, and deregulation
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became ubiquitous across the developing world (Williamson 1990; Summers and Pritchett 1993;
Babb 2009). As world-systems perspectives would predict, lending programs under IMF auspices
generally failed to promote economic growth (Dreher 2006), and their socio-economic
consequences were deleterious (Babb 2005; Sassen 2014; Kentikelenis 2017).
Examining the causes of poor performance, political economists have noted the paradox that
structural adjustment programs assume state capability to implement complex economic and
administrative policies, and simultaneously stipulate reforms that hollow out the state, most
notably by defunding or restructuring the bureaucracy (Callaghy 1989; Haggard and Kaufman
1989; Biersteker 1990; Haggard and Kaufman 1992: 25; Waterbury 1992). Eventually, this
reality caught up with IMF staff, who—from the 1990s—started to promote the ‘good
governance’ agenda, itself a set of Western norms about how states should be organized (Kiely
1998). These efforts centered on reducing corruption by limiting the scope of bureaucratic
authorizations, introducing tax reforms, increasing fiscal transparency, and removing price
subsidies on government services (Mitra et al. 2016). Critics of this approach have long noted that
while many elements of this policy agenda are desirable, they are neither necessary nor sufficient
criteria for spurring development (Kiely 1998). The tailoring, sequencing, and pacing of reforms
is of utmost importance, but rarely given appropriate treatment in blanket one-size-fits-all good
governance prescriptions (Grindle 2004). Indeed, countries that have managed to escape
underdevelopment built up bureaucratic capacities despite not meeting most tenets of this policy
agenda (Wade 1990).
We build on—but also depart from—world systems accounts of the role of powerful international
organizations. After all, these organizations are developed to solve global coordination problems,
and membership carries some privileges and opportunities for countries that join (Barnett and
Finnemore 2004). For example, a key mandate of the IMF is to help countries achieve balance-ofpayments stability, a factor contributing to economic development and not ipso facto
dependency-inducing. What matters is how this mandate is put to practice. Our starting premise is
that not all IMF programs are alike, and that we need to consider the content of specific
conditions. Following previous studies and the IMF’s own classificatory schema, we distinguish
between ‘structural conditions’ and ‘stabilization conditions’ (e.g. Vreeland 2007; Dreher 2009;
Woo 2013). This distinction is useful because it allows us to untangle the bureaucratic quality
effect of quantitative reductions in state activity in the economy from the effect of qualitative
changes in the ways that states govern societies.
3.1. Structural conditions and bureaucratic quality
Since the mid-1980s, the IMF advocated structural conditions to tackle the purported root causes
of economic weakness (Nowzad 1981; Khan and Knight 1983; Polak 1991). Structural conditions
have attracted criticism because they impinge on the sovereignty of borrowers, while at the same
time failing to demonstrate effectiveness in resolving economic crises (Easterly 2005). We add to
this criticism that structural conditions undermine bureaucratic quality through their impact on
the behavior of state bureaucrats and private businesses.
Structural conditions lower the ability of the state to attract or retain qualified personnel. These
conditions cut deeply into public sector entitlements, including working conditions, social
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security, average pay, and additional benefits. For example, Armenia’s 1995 IMF program
required the government to “finalize a plan to […] eliminat[e] or merge ministries” (IMF 1995).
In 1996, Georgia was asked to “reduce the number of ministries and committees” (IMF 1996).
The IMF also pushed for wage cuts and greater wage dispersion. For example, in Bulgaria, the
government was required to “[s]ubmit […] amendments to the Labor Code with provisions
making hiring, firing, and working hours more flexible” (IMF 2000). In addition, structural
conditions ask countries to cede ownership of state-owned enterprises to private actors. The IMF
argues that these measures are necessary to improve the business climate, foster job creation, and
support growth over the medium term (IMF 2014), identifying the public sector as the major
cause of fiscal deficits and sluggish performance (Waterbury 1992: 183). But these measures
carry important downsides for the bureaucracy, as job insecurity and reduced pay may result in
resignations, early retirements, or reduced willingness to deliver public services impartially.
From the perspective of business actors, structural conditions seek to remove privileges (i.e., rent
extraction) in selected sectors of the economy. For example, in its program with Bulgaria, the
IMF mandated issuance of a decree that eliminated tariff quotas and exemptions. The same
agreement mandated lower import tariffs for a range of goods and a reduction in the dispersion of
tariff rates. Other conditions seek to eliminate state subsidies, price guarantees, and regulatory
protections. From the perspective of the IMF, the rationale for these measures “stems from the
purposes of the IMF and the importance of open trade regimes for sustainable growth, durable
macroeconomic stabilization, and balance of payments viability” (IMF 2001). However,
threatened by the removal of protection, businesses will increase their efforts to lobby state
bureaucrats to prevent the envisaged policy changes (Haggard and Kaufman 1989: 223). As a
consequence of structural conditions, business actors may thus paralyze the state administration
with requests to protect their privilege.

3.2. Stabilization conditions and bureaucratic quality
The IMF considers economic crises to primarily be the result of excessive demand; consequently,
its policy conditions seek to reduce aggregate demand (Polak 1991). For this purpose, the IMF
mandates stabilization conditions on macroeconomic variables such as external debt, the fiscal
balance, and inflation rates. Stabilization conditions specify broad targets on these
macroeconomic variables with a view to achieve balance-of-payments stabilization in the short
term.
To be sure, adjustment toward stringent stabilization targets can worsen economic crises
(Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Dreher 2006; Dreher and Walter 2010), and impose high social
costs (Babb 2005; Kentikelenis et al. 2015; Stubbs et al. 2017). However, with respect to
bureaucratic quality, stabilization conditions are neutral. This is because these conditions do not
necessarily change the ways in which the state carries out its functions (Tanzi 1998). For
example, almost all IMF programs require ceilings on government debt (Kentikelenis et al. 2016),
as excessively high debt-to-GDP ratios increase borrowing costs and the likelihood of economic
shocks. But there are several ways in which governments can limit their indebtedness: they may
renegotiate the terms of existing debt contracts to ease debt service, reduce government subsidies,
and boost tax collection; they may also take measures to promote economic growth, which
reduces the debt-to-GDP ratio.
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In other words, stabilization conditions do not oblige governments to enact specific reforms but
leave them with some discretion in how to achieve economic policy objectives. Governments will
use this discretion to protect the state-society relationships that are vital to policy implementation.
More specifically, governments will avoid alienating business interests and imposing burdens on
the public sector unless explicitly forced to do so by respective structural conditions, as these
interests groups are well-organized lobbies whose cooperation is required for policy
implementation (Haggard and Kaufman 1992: 25; Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012). Thus,
unlike structural conditions, stabilization conditions allow governments to circumvent difficult
reforms that drain their implementing capacity. By leaving unaffected the ways in which states
govern their relationships with important societal actors, stabilization conditions do not have the
same negative impact on bureaucratic quality as structural conditions do.
4. Data and methods
Our initial dataset comprises 141 developing countries observed from 1985 to 2014.2 We collapse
all information into three-year periods.3 At most eleven periods are available per country.
Arranging the data in three-year periods has two advantages. First, our substantive interest is the
medium-term effect of IMF programs on state capacity. From a policy perspective, medium-term
effects are more relevant because building capable states is almost impossible in the short-term.
State capacity is thus an inherently slow-moving variable. Second, short-term measurement of
state capacity is plagued with subjectivity bias, which implies that measures may react to events
unrelated to what they are supposed to measure (Stubbs, King, and Stuckler 2014). Averaging
observations over several years filters out noise due to perception bias; it also enhances the
statistical properties of variables with discrete measurement levels (Dreher and Siemers 2009).
4.1. Research design
Dependent variables
State capacity is operationalized as BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY, measured using the corresponding
perception-based indicator from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). It scores high in
“countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes
in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy
tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism
for recruitment and training” (PRS Group 2015).4 The ICRG indicator on bureaucratic quality is
widely used in the literature on state capacity (e.g., Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001; Bäck and
Hadenius 2008; Broich et al. 2015). To ease interpretation, we rescale the variable to range from
0 to 100.
To check the validity of our outcome measure, we correlated the ICRG indicator with two widely
used alternative cross-sectional measures of bureaucratic quality (see Appendix A). First, the
                                                                                                                
2

We exclude high-income countries because they already have high bureaucratic quality in the period under
study and almost no IMF programs, which would unduly raise the strength of our results.
3

Our results are robust to averaging over two-year periods.

4

The codebook does not provide information as to how bureaucratic quality is being assessed, but notes that
assessments are made on the basis of subjective analysis of the available information.
9
  

ICRG measure is highly correlated with the ‘Weberianness’ index, and specifically its
subcomponents on merit-based recruitment, competitive salaries, and bureaucratic quality (Evans
and Rauch 1999). Second, the ICRG measure is strongly correlated with professionalism and
impartiality of public administration, as measured by the Quality of Government Institute
(Dahlström et al. 2015). Furthermore, following the methods proposed by Kurtz and Schrank
(2007), we conduct auxiliary regressions to verify that the ICRG measure is not biased by
perceived changes in bureaucratic quality, proxied by contemporaneous economic growth
(Appendix A). As a result of these empirical tests, we argue that the ICRG indicator closely
captures the notion of bureaucratic quality.
In addition to the ICRG measure, we examine an experience-based measure of bureaucratic
quality that does not suffer from potential perception bias: the percentage of firms experiencing
acts of bribery by public officials, available from the Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey (BEEPS 2016). While freedom from corruption is not tantamount to
bureaucratic quality, a public administration that is relatively free of corruption is likely to be
more capable than one that is mired by corruption (Rothstein and Teorell 2012). Indeed,
empirical studies often rely on corruption as a proxy for administrative quality (Adserà, Boix, and
Payne 2003; Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010). We thus consider the
BEEPS measure to be an appropriate alternative to the ICRG measure.
Independent variables
As discussed earlier, our expectation is that not all parts of an IMF program affect bureaucratic
quality. Different program parts—loan resources, loan conditions, and technical advice—may
have different effects. Allowing for such effect heterogeneity, we employ several measures.
In regressions that seek to establish the total effect of IMF programs, we use a binary variable
indicating the presence of an IMF PROGRAM in the relevant period. This variable captures the
overall effect of IMF involvement (e.g., Vreeland 2003; Atoyan and Conway 2006; Nooruddin
and Simmons 2006). We subsequently conduct regressions among observations with IMF
programs that include the number of STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS and STABILIZATION CONDITIONS
in these programs.5
For robustness tests, we use additional indicators, such as the total number of conditions (Dreher
and Vaubel 2004; Copelovitch 2010). Referred to as ALL CONDITIONS in regression outputs, the
total number of conditions captures the overall depth of conditionality. In addition, we test
separately for the impact of conditions on the PUBLIC SECTOR, PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES, and PRICE DEREGULATION.
We only count binding conditions in each category, which include so-called ‘prior actions’ and
‘performance criteria’ (Dreher 2009; Copelovitch 2010; Woo 2013). This choice is appropriate
because binding conditions directly determine scheduled disbursements of loans: failure to
implement them can lead to program suspensions. In contrast, non-binding conditions serve as
                                                                                                                
5

It is useful to include both conditions in one regression to untangle the effects of both types of conditionality.
Woo (2013) includes only the number of structural conditions along with a program dummy, which is
problematic because the estimate on structural conditions may also pick up some effects of stabilization
conditions to the degree that both types of conditions are correlated.
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markers for broader progress assessment, and non-implementation does not automatically
suspend loan payments (IMF 2001). IMF variables are drawn from a newly-constructed database
on IMF conditionality from 1985 to 2014 (Kentikelenis et al. 2016). All above variables are
lagged by one period to allow for some delay in the realization of effects.
Control variables
We rely on a set of control variables drawn from the literature on state capacity. Most studies
focus on the macro-historical determinants of state capacity, which include legal origin,
geography, and ethno-linguistic fractionalization (e.g., Alonso and Garcimartín 2013; Savoia and
Sen 2015). Our inclusion of country-fixed effects obviates the need to control for these timeinvariant measures; subsequently, we thus focus on time-varying correlates of bureaucratic
quality (Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010).
Bureaucratic quality is driven by a range of socio-economic factors. First, we include the natural
log of GDP PER CAPITA, given that wealthier states are better able to sustain capable
bureaucracies (e.g., Bäck and Hadenius 2008). We also include the level of democracy measured
by the POLITY IV INDEX (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2015). Citizens in democracies hold
government more accountable and are able to express demands for public goods, which should
increase incentives to invest into a capable bureaucracy (Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and
Lapuente 2010; Fortin-Rittberger 2014). Empirical studies also show a positive effect of
democracy on governance quality, measured by the control of corruption (Montinola and
Jackman 2002), bureaucratic quality (Bäck and Hadenius 2008), and various indices of
governance (Adserà et al. 2003; Charron and Lapuente 2010). In addition, we measure the
incidence of CIVIL WAR (Gleditsch et al. 2002), which negatively affects the extractive capacity
of the state and thereby reduces its capacity (Centeno 2002; Besley and Persson 2008), and is in
contrast to external war which offers incentives to invest in state capacity (Tilly 1990; Besley and
Persson 2008; Lektzian and Prins 2008). The above control variables are used in most studies on
state capacity and therefore we consider them a minimal set.
In robustness checks, we expand the set of control variables to include variables on integration
into the world economy and access to non-tax resources. In particular, TRADE OPENNESS may
indicate the entrenchment of exploitative trade relationships with core nations that diminish
resources in peripheral nations to build state capacity (Kentor 1981); alternatively, it may
increase pressures for redistribution and hence the need for a more sophisticated bureaucratic
apparatus (Bäck and Hadenius 2008). We transform this variable using the natural logarithm to
normalize its distribution. Economists have also noted the potential benefits of foreign direct
investment for state institutions (Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles 2002; Alfaro, Kalemli-Özcan, and
Sayek 2009), whereas dependency theorists view it as an additional transfer in surplus to the core
(Baran 1957; Frank 1967); we therefore include the natural log of FDI INFLOWS as a percentage
of GDP. Aid dependence—measured by FOREIGN AID per capita—could both enhance and
diminish bureaucratic quality. While it provides resources that can be used to build administrative
capacity (Jones and Tarp 2016), it also represents non-tax revenue and hence might reduce
accountability (Moss et al. 2006; Djankov et al. 2008). Finally, we include the natural log of OIL
PRODUCTION per capita as another important source of non-tax revenue (Humphreys 2005; Thies
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2010; Ross 2013).6 Appendix B presents descriptive statistics (Table B1) and detailed variable
definitions (Table B2).
In addition to these variables, we always include a lagged dependent variable, country-fixed
effects, and period-fixed effects. Inclusion of the lagged dependent variable reflects the fact that
bureaucratic quality moves rather slowly while also addressing concerns about serial correlation
(Keele and Kelly 2005). Country-fixed effects absorb all unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity
and period-fixed effects capture period-specific factors that affect all countries equally with
respect to bureaucratic quality. Finally, we also checked for potential non-stationarity in the
dependent variable (Appendix B) using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, which rejects the null
hypothesis that panels contain a unit root (p<0.001).
4.2. Methods
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we estimate the total effect of IMF programs on
bureaucratic quality by comparing the evolution of bureaucratic quality for countries that
underwent IMF programs and those that did not. Second, for all countries under IMF programs,
we compare countries with specific conditions to those without, thus estimating the effect of
conditionality (among panel observations with IMF programs). This approach enables us to
isolate the kinds of conditions with the strongest impact on bureaucratic quality.
This approach involves two challenges. The first one is the well-known sample selection bias,
which arises because borrowing countries are inherently different from non-borrowing countries
and these differences may be systematically related to bureaucratic quality. The conventional
approach to address non-random selection is a Heckman model (see Appendix C). The main idea
is to explicitly model the selection into IMF programs and then use the so-called ‘inverse Mills
ratio’ as an additional predictor in the bureaucratic quality equation. We employ a standard set of
variables from previous literature to explain selection of countries into IMF programs. To
enhance the reliability of the estimation, at least one of those variables should serve as ‘exclusion
restriction’—a variable that explains program participation but does not affect bureaucratic
quality except through its impact on program participation. Following previous literature, we
argue that the alignment of voting patterns between the borrowing country and the G7 countries
in the United Nations General Assembly fulfills this criterion, because political allies of big
powers receive favorable treatment in the international financial institutions (Thacker 1999; Barro
and Lee 2005; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009). At the same time, the voting behavior of IMF
borrowers is plausibly unrelated to bureaucratic quality. We therefore include the variable UNGA
VOTE ALIGNMENT (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2015). In addition, we include the number of
COUNTRIES UNDER PROGRAMS, since program participation is affected by the extent to which the
Fund has resources available; this in turn depends on the current number of program countries
(Vreeland 2003: 88). Moreover, past involvement of a country in an IMF program reliably
predicts current participation (Conway 1994; Bird, Hussein, and Joyce 2004; Easterly 2005). We
thus include PAST PROGRAM, a dummy variable indicating whether or not a country had a
program before. These three variables—along with regional effects and time period dummies—
explain a significant proportion of IMF programs, and therefore constitute our baseline variables
in the selection equation. In an extended specification, we add macroeconomic fundamentals,
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including foreign reserves, debt service, current account balance, as well as political factors,
notably the incidence of national elections (Appendix B). In preview of our analysis, we find that
different specifications for the selection model do not affect our main results.
An additional challenge—not relevant for previous research that only used program dummies to
identify the effect of IMF programs—is potential endogeneity of conditions. For example,
countries may be more likely to obtain certain types of conditions precisely because their
bureaucratic quality is weak to begin with. In this case, our estimates would reflect this selection
process rather than the genuine impact of conditions on our outcome of interest. To address this
challenge, we use an instrument for IMF conditionality. In our case, a valid instrument is a
variable that predicts the number of conditions (‘relevance criterion’) but affects bureaucratic
quality only through its impact on conditionality (‘exclusion criterion’). Instruments are hard to
find, but we are able to draw on an instrumentation strategy that has been popularized mainly in
aid effectiveness research (e.g, Bun and Harrison 2014; Nunn and Qian 2014; Lang 2016). For
each type of condition, we construct a compound instrument based on the interaction of the
within-country average of these conditions and the period-specific budget constraint of the IMF
as measured by the number of COUNTRIES UNDER PROGRAMS. This instrument is relevant because
if the IMF needs to assist more countries, its budget constraint becomes binding and it will
require more conditions to safeguard repayment (Vreeland 2003; Dreher and Vaubel 2004; Lang
2016). The instrument is valid, too, because even if there was endogeneity between the timevariant budget constraint and bureaucratic quality, the exclusion restriction would only be
violated if the unobserved variables driving this relation were correlated with the country-specific
average of conditionality (see e.g., Bun and Harrison 2014; Lang 2016). In all regressions that
involve conditionality, we control for the non-selection hazard in order to remove potential bias
due to an unrepresentative sample.7
5. Results
5.1. Total effect of IMF programs
We utilize multivariate analysis using data aggregated into three-year periods. Table 1 reveals no
significant relationship between IMF programs and bureaucratic quality. This finding holds for
alternative sets of control variables. Model 1 includes no control variables except for the lagged
dependent variable (called X0) in the outcome equation and minimal controls in the selection
equation (Z1). Model 2 adds the most commonly used control variables to the outcome stage—
income per capita, democracy, civil war, and economic growth (X1). Model 3 includes additional
variables related to demographics, economic integration, and resource endowments (X2). The last
two models extend the set of variables in the selection equation to include macroeconomic
variables from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2015)—currency reserves, debt
service, and external balance—and indicators for national elections from the Database of Political
Institutions (Beck et al. 2001) to capture political motivations for requesting IMF support (Z2).
Inclusion of these variables reduces the number of observations; therefore, a tradeoff exists
between model fit versus model parsimony and estimation efficiency.
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In general, we find that coefficient estimates of control variables in the outcome equation depend
on the specification of the selection equation. Model 5 yields results consistent with theoretical
expectations; for example, factors relating positively to bureaucratic quality include income per
capita and FDI inflows, while civil war is negatively related.
[Table 1 here]
5.2. The effects of IMF conditionality
Following our theoretical discussion, we explore whether structural conditions are harmful for
bureaucratic quality. By conditioning on observations with IMF programs, we essentially
compare a program country under a specific conditionality profile to the same country under a
different conditionality profile. Inclusion of an inverse Mills ratio addresses potential selection
bias from only considering countries under IMF programs.
Table 2 presents regression results of bureaucratic quality on two key types of IMF conditions.
Consistent with theoretical expectations, we find that structural conditions reduce bureaucratic
quality; stabilization conditions do not have a significant impact. Note that these estimates can be
interpreted causally as a result of instrumentation. Using model 5 to interpret effect magnitudes,
we find that one structural condition reduces bureaucratic quality by, on average, 1.24 points on a
0-100 scale (p<0.05), all else equal. For an increase by one standard deviation (sd=3.27),
bureaucratic quality reduces by 4.04 points (one fifth of its standard deviation). Given our
dynamic model specification, a one-standard deviation increase in the number of structural
conditions thus exerts a cumulative impact of 18.4 points (almost one standard deviation of
bureaucratic quality).8 Hence, the near-universal adoption of structural adjustment measures in
the 1990s has substantive long-lasting effects.
The above results are credible for at least two reasons. First, our models include numerous control
variables, which represent a more stringent test for our variables of interest. In particular, twoway fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable absorb a lot of variation. It is therefore not
surprising that none of the control variables reach statistical significance. Second, our diagnostic
statistics for the compound instruments are strong. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics are far above
the conventional threshold of ten—a critical value below which the potential bias from weak
instruments becomes too large to compensate for the original bias from not using any instruments
at all (Staiger and Stock 1997). The F-statistics in our regressions imply that the bias from weak
instruments is less than five percent of the endogeneity bias (Stock and Yogo 2005).
5.3. Further analyses
We conduct additional analysis to ensure that our key findings are not driven by alternative
explanations. In particular, we verify that structural conditions, rather than a more general burden
of adjustment arising from a high number of program conditions, are responsible for the decline
in bureaucratic quality. To discard this alternative interpretation, we examine the impact of ALL
CONDITIONS on bureaucratic quality, again using compound instrumentation to mitigate potential
                                                                                                                

This is computed as follows: ßS/(1-a), where a is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, and ßS is
the coefficient on structural conditions.  
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endogeneity. As shown in Table 3, the number of conditions alone does not undermine
bureaucratic quality. While the point estimate indeed is negative (mirroring the negative total
effect of IMF programs earlier), it is not significant. It also is harder to find a strong instrument
for the total number of conditions, most likely because there is less variation in the number of
conditions than in the specific content of conditions.
In addition, our theory sheds some light on potential mechanisms through which conditionality
affects bureaucratic quality, notably policy conditions on public sector employment, privatization
of state-owned enterprises, and deregulation of prices. As discussed previously, public sector
reforms mandated by the IMF may have detrimental effects on the ability of states to retain
qualified personnel. As shown in Table 3, we find significantly negative effects in three models
(notably, the ones with the more credible set of control variables but with fewer observations
included). Effect magnitudes are strong, given that each public sector condition is associated with
a decline in bureaucratic quality by 4.49 points on average.
Conditions on the privatization of state-owned enterprises are thought to reduce bureaucratic
quality by lowering the permissible range of instruments through which state administrations can
influence market exchange. By removing states as stakeholders of businesses, privatization leads
to a reduction in the flow of information between state bureaucrats and business representatives.
Table 3 corroborates our expectations of a significantly negative effect of privatization conditions
on bureaucratic quality. Regardless of model specification, coefficient estimates are substantively
large and statistically significant (p<0.05); each privatization condition is associated with a
decline in bureaucratic quality by up to 8.64 points.
Conditions on deregulating prices can reduce bureaucratic quality by removing the specific
instruments necessary to devise smart industrial policies. Table 3 indeed shows a deleterious
effect of price deregulation conditions on bureaucratic quality in four models. Substantively, each
such condition reduces bureaucratic quality by up to 2.68 index points (p<0.05). Diagnostic
statistics do not suggest weak-instrument bias.
The above results reveal the specific types of structural conditions that adversely affect
bureaucratic quality, as echoed by previous qualitative research. For example, structural
conditions have compromised the ability of some African states to adequately respond to the
Ebola outbreak. While reforms to the remuneration of public health workers mandated by IMF
conditions led to the emigration of qualified personnel, the decentralization of healthcare systems
made it more difficult for state authorities to mobilize a coordinated response to the outbreak
(Kentikelenis et al. 2015).
[Table 3 here]
A remaining concern is the possibility that findings are driven merely by changes in perceptions
about bureaucratic quality. Therefore, we verify that our argument holds using the BEEPS
measure of the percentage of firms experiencing acts of bribery by public officials. In  order  to  
include  country-fixed  effects,  we  discard  all  countries  with  less  than  two  survey  waves,  
which   leaves   us   with   overall   125   observations   from   43   countries.   As   before,   we   first  
scrutinize   the   total   impact   of   IMF   programs   before   considering   the   two   types   of   IMF  
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conditions.   Table  4   shows   the   results.   Column   1   tests   for   the   overall   impact   of   IMF  
programs   using   country-level   controls.   When   a   country   undergoes   a   program,   its  
reported   incidence   of   corruption   increases   by   roughly   18%.   Column   2   suggests   that  
structural   conditions   further   increase   corruption:   each   additional   structural   condition  
increases   the   percentage   of   firms   experiencing   acts   of   bribery   by   2.7%   (p<0.05).   The  
effect  of  stabilization  conditions  remains  insignificant.  In  the  subsequent  models,  we  add  
control   variables   available   from   the   BEEPS   survey   related   to   firm   characteristics.   This  
improves   model   fit   but   turns   the   effect   of   IMF   programs   and   the   inverse   Mills   ratio  
insignificant.   The   negative   effect   of   structural   conditions   becomes   even   stronger  
(p<0.05),  while  stabilization  conditions  tend  to  mitigate  corruption  in  this  model  (p<0.10).  
Overall,   the   replicability   of   our   results   using   an   experience-based   measure   of  
bureaucratic  quality  increases  our  confidence  in  the  main  results.  
[Table  4  here]  
5.4. Robustness tests
The Supplemental Appendix includes the results of all estimating equations as well as further
robustness tests. With respect to selection into IMF programs, we find that past programs, low
reserves in months of imports, current account deficits, and executive elections are robust
predictors of current programs. Coefficients on UNGA voting patterns are not always statistically
significant but have the expected sign. With respect to the determinants of structural conditions,
we find that low per capita income, absence of civil war, low growth, and small inflows of
foreign direct investment are significant determinants.
We also used an alternative definition of our conditionality variables that deducts the number of
conditions for which countries obtained a waiver during the course of the adjustment program
(Table B3). In exceptional circumstances, but also as a result of intervention of big powers on
behalf of their geopolitical allies, the Executive Board can waive certain conditions in order to
help countries pass the staff review on their loan program (Babb and Carruthers 2008: 20).
Taking waivers into account does not substantively alter the results. Coefficient estimates on
structural conditions remain negatively significant in most models, while stabilization conditions
remain insignificant. Applying the waiver correction to issue area conditions, we find that labor
conditions remain statistically significant in only two models; privatization conditions remain
negatively significant throughout all specifications; and the four estimates on price deregulation
previously found significant also remain significant. Effect magnitudes are comparable and
instrument diagnostics are strong.
Finally, we show that our results do not hinge on the assumption that countries have high levels
of bureaucratic quality to begin with. To be sure, state-society arrangements—such as embedded
autonomy—require a professionalized bureaucracy (Haggard and Kaufmann 1992: 20); hence,
structural conditions will have the most detrimental impact where they undermine intact statesociety arrangements (while having less impact where such arrangements do not exist in the first
place). However, even weak states have some pockets of bureaucratic quality (Skocpol 1985: 13);
therefore, bureaucratic quality can decline as a result of conditionality, even in low-capacity
states. We conduct a series of regressions excluding the (purportedly) least capable states; our
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argument would be supported if our effects remained similar, while it would be refuted if effects
were to subside without these weak states. We use three different indicators of weak capacity:
fragile states (World Bank 2016); low-income countries (GNI per capita below 1,025 USD); and
countries in the lowest decile of initial bureaucratic quality. Our main results are unaffected by
these sample restrictions (Table B4).
6. Discussion and conclusion
This article examined the impact of structural adjustment programs on the bureaucratic quality of
borrowing countries. These programs coerce governments of peripheral nations to adopt policy
reforms that—explicitly or implicitly—favor the interests of core nations, and are thus ideal sites
to study world-system pressures. We utilized a dataset of up to 141 developing countries
observed over three-year periods from 1985 to 2014 and deployed an appropriate econometric
toolkit to find that structural conditions lead to lower bureaucratic quality. Further probing into
the policy issues targeted by conditionality, we find that conditions on state-owned enterprise
privatization, price deregulation, and—to a lesser extent—public sector employment
flexibilization have a significantly negative effect on bureaucratic quality. Our argument is
further bolstered by converging results on two separate indicators of bureaucratic quality—a
perception-based measure from ICRG and an experience-based measure from firm surveys.
Before discussing broader implications of our findings, we note two limitations. First, our results
are based primarily on a subjective measure of state capacity. To be sure, subjective measures are
widely used in the relevant literature (Adserà et al. 2003; Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Broich et
al. 2015). Among these indicators, the ICRG index is still the most widely available (covering the
period from 1984 to 2014), and its values can be compared over time. Another advantage is that
they seek to measure capacity rather than willingness to provide public goods. However,
subjective measures are not uncontroversial, mainly due to perception biases (Kurtz and Schrank
2007; Stubbs et al. 2014). To mitigate this concern, we averaged all observations into three-year
periods to smooth out unsystematic variation while also testing the validity of the ICRG measure
in auxiliary multivariate tests. Furthermore, we replicated our findings using a more objective
measure of bureaucratic quality based on experienced corruption of firms with government
officials, reported to the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey.
A second limitation pertains to the more general problem of identifying causal relationships. Due
to our use of instrumental-variable estimation, the negative effect of structural conditions on
bureaucratic quality has a causal interpretation,   while the main competing interpretation—that
countries with weak state capacity receive systematically different conditions—can be ruled out.
But definitive answers to complex cause-and-effect questions are rarely possible to obtain using
the non-experimental research designs typical of the social sciences and deployed in this study
(Morgan and Winship 2007). Econometric innovations have emerged to ameliorate some of these
concerns, but for every strategy there are untestable assumptions, such as the perennial problem
of instrument excludability, as well as the possibility—however remote—that factors correlate
with each other by happenstance. While we employed the most rigorous econometric methods
available (replete with checks for robustness of results), ultimately case studies that gather both
quantitative and qualitative data on mechanisms at the national level of analysis on why particular
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countries adopt particular IMF programs would further strengthen confidence in our findings, in
line with neo-Lakatosian perspectives on method (King and Sznajder 2006).
More broadly, our study builds a theoretical and empirical bridge between world systems theory
and Weberian-inspired political sociology. World-systems perspectives give a broad-brush
account of the emergence of weak states in developing countries as a direct result of the
enrichment of advanced economies; alternatively, Weberian-inspired political sociology provide
rich macro-historical narratives rooted primarily in domestic political processes, which emphasize
professional bureaucracies as an essential precondition for the development of a capable state.
We showed that the global economy is structured in a way that undermines state capacity in poor
countries, and elucidated the specific causal mechanisms by which this process operates.   By
identifying the features of IMF programs that undermine bureaucratic quality, we also
demonstrated that state capacity is amenable to direct policy intervention within much shorter
timeframes than sociologists had previously assumed. Taken together, our study offers a
conceptual and methodological toolkit that enables scholars to intersect domestic and worldsystems level analyses, as the policies and practices of international organizations—of which the
IMF is but one important case—at once serve as the bureaucratic infrastructure of globalization
that entrench global power asymmetries.
Viewed in this light, future research can take on the task of developing nuanced, mechanismdriven explanations of how the world system operates under the contemporary political-economic
milieu. This can include tracing additional global–national or global–subnational links that lockin underdevelopment, and critically examining ‘success cases’ of peripheral countries that have
managed to carve out specific paths to development (Cardoso 2009). An additional avenue for
research is to advance class-based analyses of the structure of contemporary globalization (e.g.,
Block 1978; Sklair 2001). International organizations, via the establishment of global rules and
norms, assert and reinforce privileges of a transnational capitalist elite, and sociologists have long
held the methodological tools necessary to advance these debates in a rigorous fashion (e.g.,
Domhoff 1990; Etzion and Davis 2008; Mizruhi 2016).
Social scientists from diverse sub-disciplines concur that state capacity is decisive for
development, and that bureaucratic quality is an essential component of state capacity. State
capacity seems only to become increasingly important as we witness how so-called ‘failed states’
can destabilize their neighbors, or even high-income countries further afield, via large-scale
refugee flows or by fomenting extremism that threatens global peace. Indeed, ‘failed states’ have
moved center-stage in recent years among academic circles (Risse and Krasner 2014), while also
conjuring nightmarish perceptions of unbridled chaos in popular media. As the antithesis of
capable states, they lack the ability to protect their borders and implement policies that could
appease their peoples. Ironically, these are also the very sites that the IMF and other international
organizations will be most intimately involved with in the future, potentially replete with detailed
policy prescriptions designed to shape political economies in the image of Western countries.
Beyond our concern with state capacity, our study offers important lessons for all international
organizations to consider. Deploying a conceptual toolkit derived from world systems theory and
Weberian-inspired political sociology, we now know which elements of IMF programs are
counterproductive and misguided (i.e., structural conditions seeking to rapidly overhaul domestic
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institutional arrangements). The stage is thus set for analogous considerations to be made at other
international organizations. That being said, it is also the case that an important role remains for
the IMF and other international financial institutions in assisting countries to overcome balanceof-payments problems. Fulfilling this role effectively will require fundamental reforms to these
organizations. Thankfully, would-be reformers need not look far for inspiration. John Maynard
Keynes’ (1943) initial proposals for the IMF acknowledged that deficits in some countries are
mirror images of surpluses in others; and so economic adjustment should not only apply to lowincome debtor countries, but also to high-income creditor countries.
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Tables
Table 1: Total effect of IMF programs on bureaucratic quality

IMF program
Lagged bureaucratic quality

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1.411
(1.587)
0.763***
(0.020)

0.453
(1.619)
0.763***
(0.020)
4.971***
(1.756)
0.043
(0.103)
-2.425
(1.830)
0.100
(0.067)

-0.055
(1.750)
0.761***
(0.021)
4.609**
(2.019)
-0.071
(0.109)
-1.909
(1.908)
0.090
(0.095)
1.986
(4.663)
3.037**
(1.506)
0.762
(0.612)
0.303
(0.493)
-1.140
(0.759)

-2.669
(2.046)
0.753***
(0.023)
3.375
(2.137)
0.053
(0.124)
-6.645***
(2.009)
0.146
(0.108)

-1.790
(2.116)
0.761***
(0.024)
4.532*
(2.588)
-0.014
(0.128)
-4.908**
(2.082)
0.112
(0.136)
-0.148
(8.198)
-0.797
(1.996)
1.623**
(0.710)
-0.209
(0.534)
-1.299
(0.824)

X0
Z1
718
5630.41

X1
Z1
633
5333.58

X2
Z1
595
5083.51

X1
Z2
467
3866.86

X2
Z2
449
3789.56

Log(GDP per capita)
Polity IV index
Civil war
GDP growth
Log(Dependency ratio)
Log(Trade openness)
Log(FDI inflows)
Log(ODA per capita)
Log(Oil per capita)

Outcome equation controls
Selection equation controls
Observations
Chi-squared

Notes: Sample includes all observations arranged in three-year periods. The dependent variable is BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY (0100). Standard errors clustered on countries shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: * .1 ** .05 *** .01
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Table 2: Structural conditions versus stabilization conditions

Structural conditions
Stabilization conditions
Inverse Mills ratio
Lagged bureaucratic quality

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-1.137*
(0.606)
0.640
(1.684)
-0.621
(1.531)
0.822***
(0.029)

-0.990*
(0.581)
0.618
(3.156)
-0.094
(1.613)
0.785***
(0.030)
10.975
(21.525)
-0.161
(0.327)
-3.627
(11.754)
-0.375
(1.620)

-1.018*
(0.552)
0.060
(4.296)
-0.470
(1.521)
0.791***
(0.026)
5.605
(35.308)
-0.152
(0.324)
-4.740
(17.098)
-0.143
(1.816)
1.305
(37.161)
2.869
(3.243)
-0.189
(1.742)
0.543
(12.813)
-2.593
(6.817)

-1.150*
(0.688)
0.559
(4.191)
2.244
(2.728)
0.765***
(0.036)
12.198
(28.811)
-0.104
(0.403)
-8.501
(15.393)
-0.383
(2.146)

-1.236**
(0.630)
0.721
(5.536)
0.164
(2.719)
0.782***
(0.033)
12.924
(39.125)
-0.156
(0.318)
-5.461
(17.705)
-0.486
(2.042)
-2.938
(39.214)
2.181
(5.026)
1.076
(1.166)
-1.839
(15.089)
-2.404
(9.203)

X0
Z1
421
-5158.53
49.30

X1
Z1
388
-4568.57
82.23

X2
Z1
377
-4431.46
61.91

X1
Z2
298
-4258.75
82.23

X2
Z2
289
-4323.90
61.91

Log(GDP per capita)
Polity IV index
Civil war
GDP growth
Log(Dependency ratio)
Log(Trade openness)
Log(FDI inflows)
Log(ODA per capita)
Log(Oil per capita)

Outcome equation controls
Selection equation controls
Observations
Log-likelihood
F-statistic (joint)

Notes: Sample only includes country-period observations with IMF programs arranged in three-year periods. The dependent
variable is BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY (0-100). STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS is instrumented using the interaction between the
country-specific mean of structural conditions and the number of countries under IMF programs in a period. STABILIZATION
CONDITIONS is instrumented using the interaction between the country-specific mean of stabilization conditions and the number
of countries under IMF programs in a period. Country-clustered standard errors shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: * .1 ** .05 *** .01
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Table 3: Further regressions on IMF conditionality and bureaucratic quality
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

All conditions

-0.390
(0.430)

-0.495
(0.542)

-0.646
(0.635)

-0.705
(0.654)

-0.958
(0.761)

Public sector conditions

-2.448*
(1.470)

-1.767
(1.465)

-1.975
(1.619)

-3.827*
(2.073)

-4.494**
(2.147)

Privatization conditions

-8.182**
(3.582)

-7.519**
(3.475)

-8.210**
(3.868)

-7.819**
(3.765)

-8.644**
(4.002)

-2.420**
(1.056)
X1
Z1
388
-3312.63
4.63

-2.583**
(1.005)
X2
Z1
377
-3208.46
3.99

-2.295
(1.464)
X1
Z2
298
-3001.81
4.63

-2.682**
(1.352)
X2
Z2
289
-2904.99
3.99

Price deregulation conditions
Outcome equation controls
Selection equation controls
Observations
Log-likelihood
F-statistic

-2.554**
(1.054)
X0
Z1
421
-3725.12
7.70

Notes: Each panel corresponds to a separate set of regressions in which we test for the effect of the respective condition.
Samples only include country-period observations with IMF programs (while including an inverse Mills ratio for selection
correction), arranged over three-year periods. The dependent variable is BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY (0-100). The respective
number of conditions is instrumented using the interaction between the country-specific mean of these conditions and the
number of countries under IMF programs in a period. All control variables are included but suppressed for reasons of limited
space. F-statistics shown is for ‘all conditions’, while F>25 for all other conditions. Country-clustered standard errors shown in
parentheses.
Significance levels: * .1 ** .05 *** .01
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Table 4: Incidence  of  corruption  and  IMF  conditionality
  
  IMF program

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

  
17.95*

  
18.40**

  
7.82

8.17

(9.51)

(8.90)

(9.26)

(7.82)

  
Structural
conditions

2.70**

(1.77)

-10.70**

  
  
  
  -5.44

(4.65)

(4.18)

(4.22)

(3.32)

  Fixed effects
Country controls
Firm controls

  Yes
Yes
No

  Yes
Yes
No

  Yes
Yes
Yes

  Yes
Yes
Yes

  Within-R2
Observations
F-statistic (joint)

  0.19
125
--

  0.65
125
54.13

  0.22
123
--

  0.62
123
50.79

  
Stabilization
conditions
  
Inverse
Mills ratio

  
  
  
  -10.22**

(1.28)

3.97**

-0.79
(0.59)

-0.90*
(0.50)
-5.34

  

Notes: Dependent variable is the percentage of firms in the BEEPS survey reporting at least one incident of
corruption by public sector officials. Data are average over three-year periods. As the BEEPS data contain
an insufficient number of repeated time observations for the compound instrument approach, we use
internal instruments as a second-best alternative. In this approach, we predict the (lagged) number of
conditions by their second lag, standard controls, and time dummies. The exclusion restriction requires that
there is no independent impact of twice-lagged conditionality on the outcome other than through its effect
on lagged conditionality. Robust country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

  

  

  

Supplemental appendices are available through the corresponding author website:
http://bernhardreinsberg.wordpress.com/publications/
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